This paper examines how the Tokyo and Osaka rice futures markets in prewar Japan were evolving in view of market efficiency. Applying a non-Bayesian timevarying model approach to analyze the famous equation for the futures premium, we find that the market efficiency of the two major rice futures markets varied with time. Such time-varying structure of the rice futures markets in prewar Japan corresponds well to historical changes in the Japanese colonial policy and domestic development of railroad system and port facilities.
Introduction
People have always confronted with price risks caused by some reasons, lean crop, wars, economic crises and etc. Historically, futures markets have been established in the world for hedging such risks; futures markets are characterized as well organized markets where forward contracts of a certain standardized commodity are transacted. The Osaka-Dojima rice futures market in the 18th century of Japan and the Chicago grain market in the 19th century of U.S. are famous historical examples. In particular, data of Japanese historical rice markets is famous for its richness. Accordingly, there is much literature about the markets. Miyamoto (1988) , Kato (2001) and Takatsuki (2012) historically study the Osaka-Dojima rice futures market in the Tokugawa-period (1603 Tokugawa-period ( -1868 . They are interested in the hedging performance of the historical rice futures markets. As for the data of the Osaka-Dojima rice futures market, Ito (1993) , Wakita (2001) and Takatsuki (2008) examine the famous equations of rice futures premium while Hamori et al. (2001) applies an error correction model to the rice futures premium. Kakizaka (2012) conducts some unit root tests for spot and futures prices of rice.
We also find literature about the rice markets in prewar Japan when its economy was in a stage of takeoff. At this time, Japan had two major rice futures markets in Tokyo and Osaka. Taketoshi (1999) examines market efficiency of the Tokyo rice futures market by using Fama and French's (1987) model. Shizume (2011) studies rational expectation formation of rice futures in the Osaka rice futures market by using Hamilton's (1987) model. Nakanishi (2002) and Koiwa (2003) discuss evolution of the two major rice futures markets in Tokyo and Osaka considering the fact that correlation of their prices and shares of trade changed with time. Recently Ito et al. (2014b) show that each market efficiency of Tokyo and Osaka rice futures markets varied with time. And they conclude that each time-varying structure of market efficiency strongly depended on often government interventions the two rice exchanges. However, they do not discuss interrelation among the two major rice markets in prices and distributions of rice.
In this paper, we further focus our attention on the interrelation among the two major rice markets in prewar Japan in the view of market efficiency, considering they were under continual structural changes. Particularly we pose the following two questions. When were the futures premium supposed to be an unbiased predictor of the ex-post spot return under the rational expectations hypothesis? And to what extent did the above relation hold? To answer these questions, we apply a linear regression model of the spot returns on the futures premium to the two major rice markets. Nevertheless, our equation is not the one usually used for foreign exchange markets, but the one with timevarying parameters. That is, we estimate the parameters of the usual regression model at period by period supposing the two major rice markets have confronted with continual structural changes. A non-Bayesian time-varying model approach allows us to estimates them and to conduct a statistical inference by a residual-based bootstrap technique (see Ito et al. (2012 Ito et al. ( , 2014c ). Our empirical results affirm the time-varying structure in the relation between the futures premium and the spot returns in prewar Japanese rice futures markets. It is found that such time-varying structure of the rice futures markets in prewar Japan corresponds well to historical changes in the Japanese colonial policy and domestic development of railroad system and port facilities. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short historical review of rice markets in prewar Japan. Section 3 presents methodologies with respect to our nonBayesian technique for a linear regression equation with time-varying parameters. This section also provides a new statistical inference for the above time-varying parameters based on a residual-based bootstrap method. The data on the rice futures markets in prewar Japan are described in Section 4. In Section 5, our empirical results show that the market efficiency in rice markets in prewar Japan varied over time and that its timevarying structure depended on the Japanese colonial policy for Taiwan and Korea. Section 6 concludes.
A Historical Review of the Rice Markets in Prewar Japan
Tokyo and Osaka, which this paper mainly addresses, have been the two biggest cities in Japan since the Tokugawa-period (1603-1868). They also have been two centers of consumption and distribution of rice, a staple in Japan. Furthermore, Osaka was a crosspoint of coastal routes (see Miyamoto (1988, pp.131-162) and Ishii (1986, pp.26-30) ) in the Tokugawa-period. Thus the biggest market of rice was formed there because of its facility of transportation of rice as agricultural tax at the time. As well known, rice futures (choaimai) had been developed in Osaka to hedge price risks of rice since the early eighteenth century (see Suzuki (1940, pp.17-54) ). Following Osaka, a new market in rice futures was opened in Tokyo in 1870s. As population of Tokyo increased after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the city had consumed more rice. This trend enhanced development of a new rice futures exchange and of a physical rice market for dealing with large volume of rice arrived from remote places (see Omameuda (2000, p.195) ). Before 1870s, most of rice transported to Tokyo was from the neighboring region of Tokyo. As consumption of rice increased in Tokyo, an area named Fukagawa next to estuary of Sumida river, running through the center of Tokyo, attracted many merchants of rice. The merchants such as Mitsui Bussan were mainly wholesale dealers of rice cropped in remote places from Tokyo. They established Tokyo Rice Wholesalers Association in 1883 and then opened the Tokyo-Fukagawa spot rice market to deal with physical rice (see Omameuda (2004, pp.309-316) ).
In the period after 1880s, which mainly concerns us, facilities of transportation and infrastructure of transaction were developed as for the rice market in Tokyo. Each of the rice exchanges in Osaka and Tokyo formed a major rice market respectively; nevertheless, they are not always integrated. After 1880s, because of population increase and general rise in living standards all over Japan, consumption of rice continuously increased. Japan in 1890s suffered from chronic shortage of rice. Then import of rice from Southeast Asia such as Vietnam and Thai began at the time. After the Russo-Japanese War (1904) (1905) , Japan imported more rice from Taiwan and Korea, both of which were Japanese colonies at the time. Note that such imported rice had a different breed than domestic rice. The former is indica rice and the latter japonica; they have difference in texture and taste.
Although price of imported rice was lower than that of domestic rice, most consumers in Japan did not always accept the rice as a staple. Thus even poor people in urban areas preferred uneaten food in barracks, boarding houses and restaurants, which were sold for them (see Omameuda (2007, pp.58-62) ). As for imported rice until early 1910s, in general, poor people in Tohoku area, northern Japan and coal miners in Kyusyu area had consumed it. That is, ordinary consumers did not regard the imported rice as the same diet as domestic rice that they regularly ate (see Mochida (1970, pp.51-62) ). However, the contents of imported rice began to change in 1910s; inland Japan imported more japonica rice from its colonies, Korea and Taiwan. The historical facts resulted from promotion of japonica rice cropping in the colonies. The Government-General of Korea first promoted the policy in 1910, and then Taiwan followed it in mid 1920s (see Tobata and Okawa (1939, pp.438-439) and Government-General of Taiwan (1945, p.244) ). In fact, inland Japan imported more and more rice from Korea and Taiwan from 1920s. However, the imported rice at that time was not always consumed uniformly in all over Japan. In particular, most rice cropped in Korea was consumed in western Japan, including Osaka, because the shipping cost for the region was lower than that for eastern Japan (see Mochida (1970, p.140) ). Because more japonica rice was cropped in Korea and Taiwan and more such rice was imported, the shortage of rice in inland Japan from 1890s and 1910 resolved by degrees.
The Model
This section presents our econometric method to examine the time-varying structure of the rice futures market in the Meiji, Taisho and early Showa periods Japan . It is partly based on Ito et al. (2014c) , who analyze dynamic linkages of stock prices among G7 countries and examine efficiency of the international stock market. Unlike their method, ours focuses on the dynamic relation between the rice futures premium and the returns on spot rice in prewar Japan; we exmine the time-varying estimates of the famous equation for the futures premium. Employing a non-Bayesian time-varying model approach, we conduct statistical inference for the time-varying estimates by using a residual-based bootstrap technique.
Preliminaries
This paper pays attention on the relation between between the rice futures premium and the returns on spot rice. Following many earlier studies (e.g., Ito (1993) and Wakita (2001)), we adopt the famous equation for the futures premium as our starting point:
S t is the spot price at time t, F t+k|t is the futures price at time t for delivery of rice at time t + k and u t follows an independent and identically distributed process. That is, we consider the k-period forward contract. This type of regression equations is usually employed to test the unbiasedness hypothesis in the context of financial market efficiency. In practice, the null hypothesis is that (α, β) = (0, 1) and {u t } is serially uncorrelated. Note that the hypothesis refers to the joint hypothesis of risk neutrality (or no-risk premium) and rationality. In other words, the hypothesis says that no well informed speculators can expect to make excess returns (see Brenner and Kroner (1995) for details). The vast literature on the exchange futures reports that the estimated β of Equation (1) is closer to or less than zero. It is well known as the futures premium puzzle, implying strong rejections of the unbiasedness hypothesis. Unlike most exchange futures data, our data of the rice futures market in prewar Japan provides diferrent features as will be shown in the later section.
Non-Bayesian Time-Varying Regression Models
In this paper, we discuss time-varying structure of market efficiency of rice market in prewar Japan based on Equation (1). In particular, we are using the following equation:
This is a linear regression of the returns on spot rice on the rice futures premium. We concentrate our attention on whether β varies with time or not; we regard α as timeinvariant considering its insignificance in the preceding works. Equation (2) itself cannot be estimated because it is not identifiable. Thus many preceding works estimating a model with time-varying parameters usually suppose a dynamic equation with respect to such parameters, say, a random walk. Thus we assume that β t follows a random walk. It is represented as follows:
where each v t follows an independent and identically distribution. We can regard Equations (2) and (3) together as a state space model. Following Ito et al.'s (2014c) , we employ a non-Bayesian technique to estimate the parameters in the state space model using time series of S t and F t+k|t as data. 1 We consider Equations (2) and (3) together to estimate the parameters, α, β 1 , · · · , β T −k by using the following matrix form:
. . .
where x t = log S t+k − log S t and y t = log F t+k|t − log S t for t = 1, 2, · · · , T − k. It helps us not only to estimate the coefficients but also to conduct statistical inference using a bootstrap technique as will be shown in the next subsection. One can estimates the state vec-
and a prior β 0 given by OLS or GLS, familiar with economists. Note that such a vector estimated are identical with the the Kalman smoother with a fixed interval of the corresponding state space model, Equations (2) and (3). 
Statistical Inference for Time-Varying Parameters
This subsection presents our methodology of statistical inference on the time-varying estimates of β t 's in Equation (2) . The idea is so simple that we examine the estimates with the joint distribution of our time-varying estimatorβ 1 ,β 2 , · · · ,β T −k under the unbiasedness hypothesis that β t = 1 for any t and α = 0. In particular, after setting a significance level, say, 95 percent, we construct upper and lower bounds based on such a distribution as two time series:
Then, using such a confidence band made with the two series of bounds, we examine in what peridod the estimatesβ t 's are inside the band to identify the periods when the market is efficient.
However, one can hardly employ any asymptotic theory to construct the confidence band above on time-varying coefficients supposed to follow a random walk. Such difficulty stems from their asymptotes involved in Browinian motion or Brownian bridge. It is quite hard to derive them theoretically; their distributions can only be represented with some Brownian motion or Brownian bridge if it were successfull. That is, such distributions need Monte Carlo technique when we use them to conduct some statistical inference. In fact, this obliges us to adopt a residual-based bootstrap technique to construct confidence bands of parameters of a state space model under the assumption of the unbiasedness hypothesis:
for our time-varying model. We are considering the case where each β t 's are estimated by the above method while the data were generated by Equation (1) when (α, β) = (0, 1).
In practice, our residual-based bootstrap techinique consists of the following steps.
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First we fit Equation (1) to the observed data. Then we obtain a residual sequence
with replace from D 0 regarding it as an empirical distribution of the residuals. Thirdly, we generate N sets of (û
Fourth, we estimate N set of the time-varying coefficients and residuals by applying our time-varying model (4) to N bootstrap data, (
T −k ) and a prior, β 0 given, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N. Finally, we construct a confidence band of (α, β 1 , · · · , β T −k ).
Data
We utilize the monthly data on the rice spot and futures prices of the Tokyo and Osaka rice exchanges in prewar Japan. As for the rice futures data, three contract months are available: nearby contract (one month), second nearest contract (two months), and deferred contract (three months). These datasets consist of the following two statistics: (i) Nakazawa (1933) for the Tokyo rice exchange from October 1880 through November 1932, and (ii) Miyamoto et al. (1979) , the Osaka City Statistics and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (1931, p.342) for the Osaka rice exchange from April 1881 through November 1932. 4 There are a few missing values found in both statistics. Therefore, we fill the missing values by using seasonal Kalman filter. We take the first difference of natural log of the rice spot prices to obtain the returns on spot rice. And we subtract the natural log of the rice spot prices from the natural log of the rice futures prices to calculate the rice futures premium.
( Table 1 around here)
From Table 1 , we can confirm that the more the contract month is long, the more the futures premium is volatile. The table also shows the results of the unit root test along with descriptive statistics of the data. For our estimations, all variables that appear in the moment conditions should be stationary. To confirm whether the variables satisfy the stationarity condition, we apply the ADF-GLS test of Elliott et al. (1996) . We employ the Modified Bayesian Information Criterion (MBIC) instead of the Modified Akaike Information Criterion (MAIC) to select the optimal lag length. This is because, from the estimated coefficient of the detrended series,ψ, we do not find the possibility of size-distortions (see Elliott et al. (1996) ; Ng and Perron (2001) ).
Empirical Results and Discussions

Time-Invariant Regression Model
We assume a time-invariant regression model with constant parameters for our preliminary estimations. Our estimation results for a time-invariant regression model with whole sample is summarized in Table 2 : all estimates of α are almost zero, and as the contract month of the rice futures is longer, the corresponding estimates of β are increasing. These results suggest that the more the contract month is long, the more the rice market in prewar Japan is efficient.
5 Taketoshi (1999) obtains different estimates of β for each subsamples when he splits the whole sample into four subsamples, but he does not examine whether the rice market in prewar Japan is efficient using conventional statistical inferences. We therefore use Ito et al.'s (2012) non-Bayesian time-varying regression model to estimate the β because the rice market in prewar Japan may be not always efficient through the time. However, we should verify if the time-varying regression model is more appropriate than the time-invariant regression model before we adopt a new approach. Then we apply Hansen's (1992) parameter constancy test to investigate whether the time-invariant model is a better fit for our data.
( Table 2 around here) Table 2 presents the results of preliminary estimations: the estimates of time-invariant regression models (α and β), and their corresponding Hansen's (1992) joint parameter constancy test statistics (L C ). For our time-invariant regression model, the joint parameter constancy test rejects the null hypothesis of constancy at the 5% level, against the alternative hypothesis stating that the parameter variation follows a random walk process. These results suggest that the time-invariant regression model does not accommodate our data; rather, we should use the time-varying regression model for the data of prewar Japanese rice markets. Figures 1 and 2 show that the farthest contract month transaction is more efficient than those of the nearest and next-nearest ones in both the Tokyo and Osaka rice exchanges.
Time-Varying Regression Model and Market Efficiency
( Figures 1 and 2 around here) That is, the longer the contract month (maturity) in futures, the more successful for traders to hedge price risks in the rice market. It resulted from the large amount of the farthest contract month transaction in futures trading: 72.1 percent of whole futures in Tokyo and 62.7 percent in Osaka (see Kamibayashi (1935) ). The fact suggests that such transaction included a large part of required information to hedge price risks in the rice market in prewar Japan. However, examining Figures 1 and 2 carefully, one can find some periods when even the futures of farthest contract month failed to hedge price risks. Specifically, Figure 1 exhibits three periods as for the Tokyo rice exchange: late 1880s, late 1890s and from mid 1900s to 1910s; Figure 2 exhibits two periods as for the Osaka rice exchange: late 1890s and from mid 1900 to mid 1920s. In what follows, we discuss what made even the farthest month transaction sometimes fail to hedge price risks in the rice market: first, Tokyo and second Osaka in order.
First, we discuss the Tokyo rice exchange in late 1880s. From 1884 to 1889, rice export shipped from the Port of Kobe to Europe noticeably grew. The growing export resulted from upturn of terms of trade, caused by stable price of silver, and decrease in price of domestic rice at the time. The rice export from Kobe amounted to 1.39 million koku in 1888, which is more than the amount of physical rice arrived in the Tokyo-Fukagawa rice spot market, 1.12 million koku in the same year. Such large amount of rice export deterred further decrease in rice price. In particular, rice price in Tokyo subsequently remained at stable levels with a support line under influence of the movement in rice market in the Osaka-Kobe area (see Omameuda (1993, pp.18-21) ). This situation resulted from both the spot and futures prices of rice depending on those of the Osaka rice exchange in late 1880 (see Ito et al. (2014b) ). These observations provide an evidence that the rapid increase in rice export from the Port of Kobe in late 1880s triggered the strong influence of rice price in western Japan, covering Osaka and Kobe on rice price in eastern Japan, including Tokyo. Both the prices in spot and futures of rice in Tokyo essentially depended on those in Osaka and the latter deteriorated primary relation between spot and futures prices of rice at that time. However, population increase at a high growth rate of big cities such as Tokyo caused growing consumption of rice after Japan experienced a serious rice failure in 1890. Then, rice export showed rapid decrease and the above link between rice prices in Tokyo and Osaka deteriorated showed recovery. In early 1890s, it became possible to hedge price risks of rice in the Tokyo rice exchange.
Second, we discuss the market inefficiency in late 1890s. On the contrary to the case of late 1880s, import of rice rapidly grew in the period.
( Figures 3 and 4 around here) Figure 3 exhibits amounts of physical rice arrived in the Tokyo-Fukagawa spot rice market for each place of production in the Tokyo-Fukagawa rice spot market. Figure 4 exhibits the rate of imported rice to all physical rice arrived in the market. They show that imported rice explosively increased; an amount of the imported rice had 43 percent of all physical rice in the market. This rapid increase in import of rice resulted from lean crop of rice in 1897 due to bad weather (see Ota (1938, p.184) ). The imported rice from Indochina, cropped in Yangon, Ho Chi Minh and Taiwan are categorized as indica rice while domestic rice is categorized as japonica rice. Thus because of difference in texture and taste, consumers in Japan regarded such imported rice as alternative grain. In practice, they mixed domestic rice and the imported one when they cooked (see Omameuda (1993, pp.37-40) ). Notice that both the Tokyo rice exchange and Osaka-Dojima rice exchange used to deal with only two brands of rice, Musashi and Settsu, of a standard breed as domestic rice. This situation disrupted the rice market at that time. In fact, the rice market in Japan at that time dealt with different grain since only domestic rice was listed in futures market and both the imported and domestic rice was traded in spot market. Thus, the futures price failed to be a fine index of the expected price of rice. Such a situation reappeared when rice export grew again after mid 1900s.
Third, we consider market inefficiency from mid 1900s to 1910s. Figure 4 shows that imported rice rose its rate to all physical rice arrived in the Tokyo-Fukagawa rice spot market again after mid 1900s. At the same time, futures in the Tokyo rice exchange failed to hedge price risks of physical rice. In 1910s, the imported rice often amounted to more than 50 percent of all physical rice arrived in the market; rice futures failed to hedge effectively price risks of in the rice market. However, in 1920s, rice futures appeared to work well again. In order to explain this phenomenon, we need further discussion about drastic change in substance of rice cropped in Korea and Taiwan in what follows.
Japan experienced kome-soudou (the Rice Riots) in 1918. It caused large unrest in Japanese economy. Turmoil in rice market was settled in 1920; spot price of rice lowered and an amount of imported rice decreased (see Figure 4) . At the same time, the rate of imported rice to all physical rice arrived lowered to around 30 percent. In 1920s, amounts of physical rice arrived for each place of production were changing. From 1917 to 1919, their rates to all physical rice arrived in the Tokyo-Fukagawa rice spot market are as follows. The imported rice exhibited 60.7 percent, rice cropped in Taiwan 24.5 percent and rice cropped in Korea 14.7 percent respectively. From 1921 to 1923, each rates exhibits 27.7 percent, 34.1 percent and 38.2 percent in the same order. The amount of foreign rice rapidly decreased (see Sasaki (1937, pp.278-279,286) ); rice cropped in Korea shipped to Japan was japonica rice in the period. After 1910s, the Government-General of Korea promoted rice cropping of the same breed as domestic rice. In fact, as for the rate of such rice to whole rice production in Korea, it exhibited only 5 percent in 1912, 69 percent in 1921 and 79 percent in 1932 (see Tobata and Okawa (1939, pp.438-439) ). Since japonica rice cropping was introduced to Korea, rice cropped in Korea had occupied the central position in physical rice arrived in the Tokyo-Fukagawa rice spot market. In effect, it amounted to 74.3 percent of the imported rice from 1927 to 1929 (see Sasaki (1937, pp.278-279,286) ). Furthermore, following Korea, the Government-General of Taiwan introduced japonica rice cropping in 1924 (Government-General of Taiwan (1945, p.244) ). Such promotion of japonica rice cropping in Korea as well as Taiwan made rice cropped in Korea and rice cropped in Taiwan amount to 94.4 percent of whole imported rice from 1930 to 1932 (see Sasaki (1937, p.286)) ). This means that the fraction of indica rice of the imported rice arrived in rice spot market rapidly became very small. Thus, the imported rice had hardly affected pricing in rice market in futures as well as spot even under the situation of a large amount imported rice. In summary, the change in breed of cropping rice in Korea and Taiwan let people inland consume more imported rice; it also let the rice exchanges work better in hedging price risk.
In the following part, we discuss the Osaka-Dojima rice exchange. First, we study the market inefficiency in late 1890s. In this period, distributions of imported rice in Osaka increased in the same way as Tokyo.
( Figures 5 and 6 around here) Figure 5 shows amounts of rice in year's end stock from 1891 to 1914 and an amount of physical rice in circulation for each year from 1909 to 1932 respectively. Figure 6 shows rates of imported rice to rice in year's end stock from 1891 to 1914 and to rice in circulation from 1909 to 1932. Because there is no statistics presenting volume of transaction of rice before 1908, we use rice in year's end stock as a substitute of volume of transaction of rice for such periods. Figure 6 demonstrates that rate of imported rice to whole rice in year's end stock rose from 1896 to 1898. Figures 4 and 6 show that the rate kept at relatively higher level than that of Tokyo while it was less than 10 percent. This resulted from the two facts: large portion of rice cropped in Korea was landed at the Port of Kobe and the Port of Osaka and it was consumed in Kinki and Chugoku regions (see Okada (1911, p.38) ). In 1890s rice cropped in Korea was dealt more in the Osaka rice market than in the Tokyo market; rice cropped in Korea at that time was indica rice before introduction of japonica rice cropping as described above. Thus futures trade in the Osaka-Dojima rice exchange failed to hedge price risk of physical rice for exactly the same reason as in the Tokyo rice exchange.
Second, we discuss the market inefficiency from mid 1900s to mid 1920s. As already pointed out, futures in the Tokyo rice exchange in 1910s failed to provide a fine index of the expected price of spot rice. In the Osaka-Dojima rice exchange had experienced market inefficiency for 20 years, longer than Tokyo. Such longer inefficiency resulted from two factors. The first factor is strong dependence of the Osaka rice exchange on the Tokyo rice exchange. Futures price in the Osaka-Dojima rice exchange had become dependent on that of the Tokyo rice exchange since mid 1900s. More specifically, the former depended on the latter and not vice versa from mid 1900s to early 1920s as Ito et al. (2014a) pointed. According to Figure 3 , we find that more rice cropped in western Japan was shipped to the Tokyo-Fukagawa rice spot market at the period from mid 1900s to early 1920s. Large portion of such rice came from Kyushu region. In particular, rice cropped in Kyusyu accounted for more than 90 percent of the rice cropped in western Japan shipped to the Tokyo-Fukagawa rice spot market in 1910s. Such rice cropped in Kyusyu had been transported to regions on the shore of the Setouchi Sea, say, Osaka, up until mid 1900. Then, as railroad system and port facilities in Kyusyu area were developed, in turn, rice cropped in Kyusyu was transported to Tokyo (see Nakamura (2003, pp.68-72) ). This change of distribution of rice cropped in Kyusyu let the Tokyo rice market deal with rice cropped in all over Japan while the exchange had mostly dealt with rice from eastern Japan, including Tohoku area. Finally, in this period, the Osaka-Dojima rice market, which mostly dealt with rice cropped in western Japan, became to take the second position in rice market in Japan. Consequently, price of rice futures in the Osaka-Dojima rice exchange strongly depended on that in the Tokyo rice exchange. This means that significance of the former deteriorated. The second factor is the fact that more imported rice had been traded in Osaka since 1910s. Figure 6 demonstrated that the rate of imported rice to physical rice in circulation increased from 1910s. These two factors let the function to price futures effectively deteriorate in the Osaka-Dojima rice exchange.
In mid 1920s, in turn, the function then ameliorate. Such change of market efficiency comes from the following two points. The first point is that an amount of rice cropped in western Japan transported to Tokyo decreased. Figure 3 proves that the amount began to decrease in the Tokyo-Fukagawa rice spot market in mid 1910s. This phenomenon resulted from soaring transportation cost due to World War I and increasing consumption of rice in Kyusyu area caused by industrialization of northern Kyusyu area (see Sasaki (1937, p.277-278) and Mochida (1970, pp.186-187) ). The second point is that structure of distributions of physical rice in Tokyo and Osaka had changed since mid 1920s. Figure 4 shows that imported rice amounted to about 60 percent of all physical rice arrived in the TokyoFukagawa rice spot market in mid 1920s. At the same time, imported rice accounted for from 30 to 40 percent of total physical rice in circulation of Tokyo (see Sasaki (1937, p.273-274,281-282) ). In Osaka, imported rice amounted to about 80 percent of all physical rice in circulation in mid 1920s as Figure 6 exhibits. That is, domestic rice was dealt in Tokyo while imported rice was dealt in Osaka. Note that about 95 percent of imported rice consisted of rice cropped in Korea of the same breed as domestic rice because of promotion of japonica rice cropping (see Osaka City Government (1931, ch.5,p.42) ). Thus, in the same situation as the Tokyo rice exchange, rice price in futures provided an efficient index of the expected spot price of rice.
To sum up, we assert that the Osaka-Dojima rice exchange attained a significant position in rice futures again because the amount of rice cropped in western Japan decreased in rice market in Tokyo from mid 1910s and the Osaka rice market had different structure than the Tokyo one from mid 1920s. Finally, futures price in the Osaka-Dojima rice exchange became again an effective index of expected price of physical rice in Osaka.
Conclusion
This paper discusses each market efficiency of the Tokyo and Osaka rice futures markets in prewar Japan using a non-Bayesian time-varying model approach. An extent to which rice futures markets hedges price risks depend on time; our estimates of β in the famous equation for the futures premium vary with time. The estimates of time-varying β for Tokyo and Osaka suggest how each markets deviated from the efficient market respectively. Considering the historical data of rice distribution in prewar Japan, we elucidate that increasing import of japonica rice after 1900s affected each market efficiency of the Tokyo and Osaka rice futures markets. Such increase in imported rice was caused by Japanese colonial policy of rice cropping in Korea and Taiwan.
There are three periods when the Tokyo rice futures market was inefficient: late 1880s, late 1890s and from mid 1900s to 1910s. At first, rice export grew since the goverment promote rice export to improve low price of domestic rice in late 1880s. The most of rice was shipped to overseas from the Port of Kobe. The rapid increase in exported rice influenced the rice futures market in Osaka. At that time, rice price in Tokyo strongly depended on that in Osaka since the Osaka futures market dominated the Tokyo's. Thus, the Tokyo futures market experienced market inefficiency. In late 1890s, Tokyo confronted with population increase at a high rate in late 1890s. It caused rapid increase in demand of rice, Japanese staple. Accordingly, more imported rice was required while it was indica rice. Such increasing import of rice caused disorder of rice distribution; different breeds of rice was distributed in Tokyo. Then the disorder let the Tokyo rice futures market inefficient. In turn, from mid 1900s to 1910s, imported rice increased at a high rate whereas most of the rice became japonica breed because of Japanese colonial policy of rice cropping in Korea and Taiwan. This rapid increase in imported rice from Korea and Taiwan caused temporary inefficiency in the Tokyo rice futures market from mid 1900s to 1910s. Since the imported rice was of the same breed as domestic one, the Tokyo rice futures market was efficient even in the period including the Rice Riots of 1918.
The Osaka rice futures market experienced two periods of inefficiency: late 1890s and from mid 1900 to mid 1920. The inefficiency in the Osaka rice futures market in late 1890s resulted from the increased in imported rice from Korea and Taiwan in the same way as Tokyo. In contrast, the inefficiency from mid 1900s to mid 1920s resulted from different reason than that of 1890s case. The Osaka rice futures market depended on the Tokyo rice futures market. At the same time, as railroad system and port facilities in Kyusyu were developed, more rice became shipped from western Japan, especially Kyusyu, to Tokyo in eastern Japan than before. Thus, such change in rice distribution caused the inefficiency from mid 1900s to mid 1920s.
We conclude that the two major rice futures markets in Tokyo and Osaka in prewar Japan confronted with the change of market efficiency. The historical facts resulted from imported rice from Korea and Taiwan, where the two Government-Generals promoted japonica rice cropping as a colonial policy. The time-varying structures of market efficiency in the Tokyo and Osaka rice futures markets differed from each other because of their facilities of transportation of imported rice. (1) "ADF-GLS" denotes the ADF-GLS test statistics, "Lags" denotes the lag order selected by the MBIC, and "φ" denotes the coefficients vector in the GLS detrended series (see equation (6) in Ng and Perron (2001) ).
(2) In computing the ADF-GLS test, a model with a time trend and a constant is assumed. The critical value at the 1% significance level for the ADF-GLS test is "−3.42". Notes:
(1) "R 2 " denotes the adjusted R 2 , and "L C " denotes Hansen's (1992) joint L statistic with variance.
(2) Newey and West's (1987) robust standard errors are in brackets.
(3) R version 3.1.0 was used to compute the estimates and the statistics. Notes:
(1) The dashed red lines represent the 95% confidence bands of the estimates in case of efficient market.
(2) We run 5000 times bootstrap sampling to calculate the confidence bands. 
